European Commissioner for Defence Andrius Kubilius has called for a tougher European response to hybrid attacks attributed to Russia, arguing that the EU must develop a form of “hybrid defence” capable of deterring sabotage, cyber operations and other pressure tactics.
Speaking at the Euronews Defence and Space Summit on 30 September 2026, the former Lithuanian prime minister said Moscow should face consequences that match the impact of attacks directed at European countries. His comments come amid accusations from Estonia and Germany linking recent incidents to Russian activity, although the allegations concern specific cases and do not establish a general finding about every suspected attack.
Kubilius urges Europe to make hybrid attacks costly
Kubilius said Europe’s response to Russian hybrid attacks should be sufficiently forceful to deter further action. He argued that Moscow is attempting to create fear among European populations and influence public attitudes towards support for Ukraine.
“If we are hit by Russian hybrid attacks, our answers should be as painful as that attack,” Kubilius said during an interview at the summit. He added that the precise form of that response was a matter for European governments and institutions.
The commissioner described the challenge as a hybrid war requiring a coordinated hybrid defence. That can include strengthening critical infrastructure, improving intelligence-sharing, protecting elections and public information systems, and responding to sabotage or cyber incidents. The source material does not indicate that the European Union has adopted a new sanctions package or specific retaliation plan following Kubilius’s remarks.
Recent incidents raise concerns across Europe
The comments follow several incidents that European authorities have attributed to Moscow:
- Estonia accused the Kremlin of orchestrating an arson attack on a drone manufacturer supplying Ukraine.
- Germany attributed an attempted drone attack involving Ukrainian cargo planes at Leipzig/Halle Airport to Russia.
These cases illustrate why hybrid threats have become a central issue in European security discussions. Unlike conventional military attacks, hybrid operations can involve covert sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, interference with democratic processes and pressure on infrastructure. Attribution can be politically and technically difficult, and national authorities must establish the facts before responsibility can be treated as confirmed.
For the EU, the issue extends beyond defence ministries. Transport hubs, energy networks, communications systems, technology companies and local authorities may all be exposed to disruption. Businesses involved in strategic supply chains, including firms supporting Ukraine, can also face security risks.
Commissioner rejects calls for a new diplomatic track
Kubilius also opposed calls for renewed diplomatic engagement with the Kremlin as a route towards ending Russia’s war against Ukraine. His comments came after Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev argued at the summit that Europe should maintain communication channels with Moscow and pay greater attention to the risk of nuclear escalation.
Radev said that a lasting peace would ultimately require diplomacy, while warning that the possibility of nuclear risk should not be ignored. Kubilius took a different view, saying that previous diplomatic efforts had not produced an outcome that would protect Ukraine or European security.
He characterised Russia’s stated position as demanding Ukraine’s surrender and argued that opening negotiations under those conditions could weaken Kyiv’s position. Kubilius also warned that diplomacy without sufficient pressure could encourage further escalation rather than reduce the threat.
What this means for EU security policy
Kubilius’s remarks are political advocacy rather than a formally adopted European Union decision. Any new EU sanctions, funding measures, security instruments or legislative changes would require the appropriate institutional process and, where relevant, agreement by member states or approval by the European Parliament.
The debate nevertheless points to several priorities for European security policy:
- Resilience: Governments may need to improve protection for airports, ports, energy systems and communications networks.
- Attribution: Authorities must develop reliable mechanisms for investigating and publicly explaining suspected foreign interference.
- Deterrence: EU member states may consider whether existing sanctions and countermeasures are sufficient to discourage covert attacks.
- Coordination: National governments, EU institutions and NATO partners will need to share information while avoiding duplicated responses.
- Public confidence: Clear communication can help reduce the fear and confusion that hybrid campaigns are designed to create.
Why the issue matters for Ireland
Ireland’s military neutrality does not remove it from the wider consequences of European hybrid threats. Irish airports, undersea communications infrastructure, energy networks, public institutions and businesses connected to European supply chains could be affected by disruptions originating outside the country.
Any future EU measures would need to be assessed separately from national Irish defence policy. The source material does not announce a specific new obligation for Ireland, nor does it identify an agreed EU response that has already entered into force.
What happens next?
The immediate next step is likely to be continued discussion among EU member states and European security institutions about how to prevent and respond to hybrid activity. National investigations into the incidents cited by Kubilius will also be important, particularly if authorities release further evidence or announce legal or diplomatic measures.
For now, the central disagreement is political: whether Europe should focus primarily on pressure and deterrence, or combine continued support for Ukraine with a stronger diplomatic channel to Moscow. Kubilius’s position is that diplomacy without a credible cost for Russian aggression could leave both Ukraine and Europe less secure.
Conclusion
The latest EU security debate shows that Russian hybrid attacks are being treated as a growing threat to Europe’s infrastructure, public confidence and support for Ukraine. Andrius Kubilius is calling for a response designed to deter Moscow, but his remarks are not themselves a new EU law or formally adopted policy. The next stage will depend on evidence from national investigations and on whether EU governments agree to translate political warnings into coordinated security measures.
