Standfirst: Europe’s electoral systems often give party organisations greater influence than voters over who reaches parliament and senior EU positions. Reformers argue that more open national lists, transnational European Parliament lists and a binding lead-candidate process could strengthen democratic accountability without creating unchecked personal power.
Europe’s debate over leadership is also a debate over democratic legitimacy. As governments face pressure over security, Ukraine, trade and relations with global powers, critics argue that many mainstream politicians rise through negotiations among party insiders rather than by winning a direct mandate from voters.
The argument, set out by HEC Paris professor Alberto Alemanno and Brussels policy analyst Samuel Dempsey in an opinion article, is not a report of a new EU decision. It is a proposal for changing how political candidates are selected and how Europe’s top institutional jobs are connected to elections.
Why electoral systems matter for political leadership
In many European countries, voters can express preferences for individual candidates, but those votes frequently alter only the order of candidates already chosen by parties. Where party lists are effectively controlled by national or regional organisations, loyalty to the party hierarchy can become a more reliable route to office than personal popularity.
The authors point to several examples. In Belgium, only a small proportion of Flemish national MPs elected between 1987 and 2014 won seats by overturning their party’s list order. In the Netherlands, preference votes alone secured a seat for just one candidate in the 2023 election. In Poland’s 2015 election, candidates placed near the top of party lists won the overwhelming majority of seats.
These examples illustrate a wider distinction between open lists, where voters can significantly influence which candidates are elected, and closed or tightly controlled lists, where parties largely determine the order of representation.
The European Parliament dimension
The same issue applies to European Parliament elections. Six EU member states, including Germany, France and Spain, use closed lists for those elections. The result, the authors argue, is that candidates have fewer incentives to build a personal, cross-border profile because their position depends primarily on party selection.
That can create a contrast with newer or insurgent parties. Such parties may rely heavily on one recognisable figure to attract votes, while established parties can depend more on organisational structures and established support. The article cites the prominence of Alice Weidel in the Alternative for Germany’s 2024 campaign and Jordan Bardella’s profile during National Rally’s European campaign as examples of leader-centred political communication.
How EU leadership is selected
The democratic accountability question becomes more complicated at EU level. The presidents of the European Commission and European Council are not chosen through a single direct election by all EU citizens.
The European Council, which brings together the heads of state or government of the member states, selects its president. National governments also play a central role in nominating the European Commission president, while the European Parliament must elect the nominee. This is an institutional process rather than a direct presidential contest.
That distinction matters. A politician may have strong support in a national election but still reach a senior EU post through intergovernmental negotiation. Conversely, an individual can hold significant national or European influence without having won a direct continent-wide mandate for the specific position.
The authors use Donald Tusk’s appointment as European Council president and Ursula von der Leyen’s selection as Commission president in 2019 to illustrate how the system operates. Their broader argument is that the EU’s treaties and procedures permit appointment through negotiations, even when voters have little direct influence over the final choice.
Transnational lists and the lead-candidate system
Two proposed reforms are central to the debate:
- Transnational electoral lists: candidates would compete for some European Parliament seats across national borders, encouraging campaigns aimed at voters in more than one member state.
- A binding Spitzenkandidaten process: European political parties would nominate lead candidates before European elections, with the election result playing a decisive role in determining who becomes European Commission president.
The European Parliament backed the idea of transnational lists in 2022, but the proposal has not been adopted by national governments. A lead-candidate process has also faced political resistance because governments retain a strong role in selecting the Commission president.
Supporters say these reforms could give voters a clearer connection between their ballot and EU executive leadership. Critics may worry that transnational contests would be difficult to organise across different languages, political cultures and media systems. Any change would also require agreement through the appropriate EU institutional process.
Could stronger mandates create new risks?
Greater personal visibility does not automatically produce better policy or stronger institutions. Europe’s post-war constitutional systems were deliberately designed to prevent excessive concentration of power after the experience of authoritarian rule. Parliamentary checks, coalition government, judicial oversight and independent institutions remain important safeguards.
The case for reform is therefore not necessarily a presidential EU. It is for more meaningful competition within existing constitutional limits. Possible national changes include:
- making preference votes capable of changing list rankings more often;
- giving party members a meaningful role in candidate selection;
- requiring parties to explain how candidates are chosen; and
- creating clearer links between European election campaigns and EU leadership.
Such measures would not guarantee charismatic leaders or prevent anti-establishment parties from gaining support. They could, however, make political responsibility more visible to voters.
What this means for EU politics
The argument has particular relevance to EU politics because the Union must often communicate collectively on issues that demand public consent, including defence, energy, migration, economic policy and support for Ukraine. Negotiation among governments remains essential, but it can make responsibility difficult for citizens to identify.
For Ireland, the debate is relevant because Irish voters participate in European Parliament elections and national representatives take part in the EU’s decision-making system. However, the reforms discussed are proposals rather than rules currently affecting Irish elections. Any change to European Parliament elections would require agreement at EU level and, depending on the measure, national implementation.
The central issue is whether European voters should have a stronger role in choosing the individuals who represent them and lead EU institutions. The current system prioritises compromise among parties and governments; reformers want that compromise to be matched by a clearer public mandate.
Conclusion
The debate over Europe’s electoral systems is not about replacing institutional checks with rule by strong personalities. It is about whether political leaders can be both constrained by law and directly accountable to the public. Greater voter influence over candidate rankings, transnational lists and a more binding lead-candidate process could strengthen that link. For now, these remain reform proposals, but they address a central question in European democracy: who should have the decisive say in choosing Europe’s leaders?