Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal crisis has entered a new and highly confrontational phase, with rival groups of judges disputing who has authority to lead the court and which appointments are legally valid. The conflict, rooted in a dispute that began in 2015, now involves the presidency, parliament, the government and competing interpretations of constitutional law.
The latest confrontation followed attempts by judges elected by the Sejm to take their oaths outside the presence of President Karol Nawrocki. The existing Tribunal leadership rejected those oaths, while critics argued that the president’s role should be ceremonial and that refusal to administer an oath should not block a judge from taking office.
How the Constitutional Tribunal crisis began
The dispute dates back to June 2015, when the then-governing PO-PSL coalition changed the law to allow parliament to elect five Constitutional Tribunal judges before the parliamentary election. On 8 October, the outgoing Sejm selected five candidates, but President Andrzej Duda refused to accept their oaths.
After Law and Justice, known as PiS, won the election, the new parliament declared the earlier appointments invalid and chose five alternative candidates. The president accepted their oaths. However, the Tribunal later ruled that three of the earlier appointments had been lawful, while two had been made prematurely.
That decision created the institutional problem that has continued ever since. Three PiS-backed judges were appointed to seats the Tribunal considered already occupied. They became known as “stand-in judges”, and their participation in the court’s work has remained a central point of dispute.
Changes under PiS triggered wider concerns
Between 2016 and 2023, PiS changed rules governing the Tribunal’s proceedings, including the number of judges required to hear cases and the voting thresholds for decisions. In March 2016, the Tribunal ruled that the first package of changes was unconstitutional.
The government of Prime Minister Beata Szydło declined to publish that judgment, arguing that it had been issued using incorrect procedures. The refusal to publish the ruling intensified questions about whether the court’s decisions could be treated as legally effective.
The appointment of Julia Przyłębska as Tribunal president in December 2016 added another layer to the conflict. Critics said the changes weakened judicial independence and increased political influence over the court. PiS defended them as part of a broader reform of Poland’s justice system.
The dispute also reached the European Court of Human Rights. In 2021, the Strasbourg court found that the Tribunal’s composition in a particular case, including the participation of Mariusz Muszyński, did not meet the requirement of a tribunal established by law. Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal also issued judgments challenging the primacy of certain European Union law provisions relating to the judiciary.
Tusk coalition seeks to reverse the judicial changes
After the 2023 parliamentary election, Donald Tusk’s coalition made restoring the rule of law a central political objective. In March 2024, the Sejm adopted a resolution questioning the status of the three disputed judges and Przyłębska’s authority to continue leading the Tribunal.
Two bills presented later that year proposed changes to the appointment of judges and the operation of the institution. President Duda referred both measures to the Constitutional Tribunal for review, meaning they did not take effect.
In December 2024, Duda appointed Bogdan Święczkowski as Tribunal president. The appointment was contested by the government, while the Tribunal’s leadership defended its authority. At the same time, the government limited the publication of some Tribunal rulings in the Journal of Laws, citing concerns about the court’s composition.
The result was a reciprocal institutional challenge: the government questioned whether the Tribunal was lawfully constituted, while the Tribunal disputed the government’s authority to withhold publication of its judgments.
Why the 2026 judges’ oaths became a flashpoint
In March 2026, the Sejm elected six judges to replace members whose terms were ending. President Nawrocki accepted the oaths of Magdalena Bentkowska and Dariusz Szostek but declined to accept those of Krystian Markiewicz, Anna Korwin-Piotrowska, Maciej Taborowski and Marcin Dziurda.
The presidential office cited concerns about the election procedure, including deadlines and whether candidates should have been voted on individually. It also argued that the president was not required to accept every parliamentary appointment automatically.
The government took the opposite view, maintaining that the Sejm had constitutional authority to elect the judges and that the president could not prevent them from taking office.
On 9 April, the four judges took their oaths before a notary in parliament and sent the documents to the presidential office. The presidential office and Święczkowski rejected that process, saying the oath had to be taken in the president’s presence.
The Tribunal later ruled in case K 3/26 that the president was not obliged to accept every appointment and had to be physically present for the oath. The government challenged the ruling, pointing to the disputed status of judges who participated in the case.
An interim measure from the European Court of Human Rights required Polish authorities not to obstruct the four judges from taking up their duties. The Venice Commission also said the president’s role in administering the oath should be ceremonial and that a refusal or delay should not prevent a judge from assuming office.
Confrontation reaches the Tribunal headquarters
The dispute intensified again in October when Maciej Taborowski took his oath in parliament after receiving no invitation from the president. Święczkowski refused to recognise oaths taken without the president’s presence and prevented some of the newly elected judges from sitting on cases.
On 30 October, Judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska ordered a one-month suspension of duties for Święczkowski and Vice-President Bartłomiej Sochański. She then assumed management of the institution, saying the move was needed to restore its functioning and allow all judges elected by the Sejm to work.
The existing leadership rejected the decision as unlawful. It argued that there was no legal basis for suspending the president and that judges who had not completed the presidential oath procedure were not full members of the Tribunal.
The confrontation moved inside the court’s headquarters after seven judges entered the building accompanied by State Protection Service officers. Scuffles were reported. Nawrocki arrived during the night and described the events as an attempted takeover of a constitutional institution, calling for consultations with political leaders.
What happens next?
Święczkowski has said he and the judges supporting him will seek to regain control of the Tribunal. Korwin-Piotrowska has announced plans to convene a General Assembly of judges on 3 November.
The immediate question is who can lawfully manage the institution and decide which judges may hear cases. The wider issue is whether Poland’s constitutional system can produce rulings that are accepted by the government, president, parliament and the public administration.
The crisis has direct implications for the rule of law. If state institutions disagree about the composition of the court or refuse to publish its judgments, uncertainty can affect legislation, taxation, public services and business decisions. It also continues to shape Poland’s relationship with European institutions, which have repeatedly scrutinised judicial independence in the country.
The central issue for Poland’s institutions
Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal crisis is now about more than rival appointments. It concerns the separation of powers, the independence of judges and the legal authority of constitutional rulings. Until political and judicial leaders reach an agreed framework for appointments and the publication of judgments, the country’s highest constitutional court will remain at the centre of a deep institutional dispute.