The European Parliament has called for a tougher European Union response to China, warning that relations with Beijing have reached a “critical point” because of economic pressure, trade practices and China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
MEPs approved the non-legislative resolution on 7 October 2026 as EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič travelled to Beijing for talks intended to address growing trade tensions. The vote adds political pressure on the European Commission and EU governments to reduce strategic dependencies on China and prepare stronger tools against economic coercion.
What the European Parliament decided
The resolution was backed by 454 members of the European Parliament, while 86 voted against and 110 abstained. It is a political position rather than a new EU law, meaning the text does not itself impose sanctions or activate the bloc’s Anti-Coercion Instrument.
MEPs argued that the EU-China relationship has deteriorated because of what they described as unfair economic practices, including dumping and espionage concerns, as well as Beijing’s position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The resolution describes China as a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war, citing diplomatic backing and material assistance that lawmakers say supports Russia’s military-industrial complex.
Key elements of the resolution
- A call for stronger action against economic coercion by China.
- Pressure to address Europe’s dependence on Chinese critical raw materials.
- A request that the EU consider using the Anti-Coercion Instrument if Beijing weaponises those dependencies.
- Concern about China’s relationship with Russia and its effect on European security.
- Support for diversifying supply chains in strategic industries.
Why rare earth minerals are central to the dispute
Rare earth elements and other strategic raw materials are important to sectors including electric vehicles, defence equipment, renewable energy and advanced manufacturing. China has a dominant position in the mining, production and processing of many of these materials, giving Beijing significant influence over European supply chains.
The EU experienced the risks of that dependence in 2025, when China restricted rare-earth exports during its widening trade dispute with the United States. European lawmakers now want the bloc to respond before a similar vulnerability becomes a wider disruption for manufacturers and public services.
The issue is not limited to raw materials. Supply-chain exposure can also involve processing capacity, specialist technologies, intellectual property and access to components. For the EU, reducing risk may require alternative suppliers, greater recycling, investment in domestic processing and closer cooperation with partner countries.
How the Anti-Coercion Instrument could be used
The Anti-Coercion Instrument is an EU mechanism designed to respond when a non-EU country uses trade or investment pressure to influence political decisions in the Union or a member state.
Possible countermeasures can include restrictions affecting goods, services, investment, public procurement, intellectual property rights or market access. The instrument is intended to deter coercion and encourage negotiations, rather than automatically trigger punitive action whenever a trade disagreement occurs.
The European Parliament’s resolution does not mean that the instrument has been activated against China. Any future use would require an assessment by the European Commission and the adoption of relevant implementing measures under the instrument’s legal framework.
EU-China trade talks take place amid wider tensions
The parliamentary vote came as Maroš Šefčovič travelled to Beijing for high-level discussions on the EU-China trading relationship. EU governments are seeking concrete progress at a time when member states collectively face trade deficits with China and are pressing the Commission to deliver a more balanced relationship.
Trade concerns include market access, industrial overcapacity, subsidies, technology transfers and the treatment of European companies operating in China. The disputes are unfolding alongside wider disagreements over Russia’s war in Ukraine and Beijing’s role in global supply chains.
Germany and France had also called for a stronger trade tool that could allow the Commission to impose severe measures, potentially including restrictions on access to the EU internal market. The details and legal status of any such proposal remain separate from the Parliament’s resolution.
What happens next?
The resolution increases political pressure but does not complete the EU’s decision-making process on any new measure. The next steps may include:
- Further discussions between the European Commission and Chinese officials.
- Work on a Commission proposal to encourage companies to diversify suppliers in strategic sectors.
- Assessment of whether China’s conduct meets the legal threshold for action under the Anti-Coercion Instrument.
- Continued coordination among EU member states on trade defence, economic security and support for Ukraine.
The Commission proposal on supplier diversification is expected to be presented by the end of 2026, according to the source report. Its eventual scope, legal form and implementation requirements have not yet been confirmed.
What does this mean for Ireland?
Ireland is affected by EU trade policy because the European Commission negotiates trade matters on behalf of the Union in areas covered by EU competence. Irish companies may be affected by changes involving market access, customs procedures, supply-chain security and restrictions on Chinese goods or technologies.
The most immediate implications are likely to concern businesses using critical raw materials, automotive technologies, clean-tech components and advanced manufacturing inputs. Any future EU action would need to be assessed against its effects on Irish importers, exporters and consumers.
The Parliament’s vote itself does not change Irish law or impose new obligations on Irish businesses. Further action would depend on Commission proposals, member-state decisions and the applicable EU legal process.
Conclusion
The European Parliament has delivered a clear political warning that the EU’s relationship with China cannot be separated from economic security and Russia’s war in Ukraine. The resolution calls for tougher action and urges consideration of the Anti-Coercion Instrument, but it is not itself a sanctions decision or new EU law. The next test will be whether Brussels and Beijing can make progress in trade talks while the Commission develops measures to reduce Europe’s dependence on Chinese strategic supplies.
